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ECONOMIC growth is SO broad a subject that in one sense almost
every specialty can be included in it without any effort; yet it
does seem fruitful to make a major effort to focus the relevant
specialties on the factors influencing, growth as such. The most
serious difficulty is to provide a framework in which the various
contributions can be additive.
Since my assignment was as a companion speaker to Usher, I
should like to stress my belief that our respective approaches are
complementary rather than conflicting.
1. The Process of invention and innovation
Usher's distinguished book on The Historj of Mechanical Inven-
tions1 has greatly helped us to understand the process of invention
by showing the nature of the continuous stream of new techniques
making for evolutionary change. Viewed from a high perspective,
the dams and waterfalls in this stream disappear and all that con-
fronts us is a ribbon of water descending steadily toward the ocean.
The process of invention can be fruitfully studied from the stand-
point of a continuous flow of ideas. Yet it is equally valid to think
of the process in terms of discontinuity. In the last 100 years many
major inventions have been applications of somewhat earlier break-
throughs in fundamental science. One way of looking at the his-
tory of science is to recognize that new conceptual schemes are
exceedingly difficult to create,2 that men capable of creating them
are rare, and that there is a random element in the timing of the
appearance of such men. It is true, of course, that the introduction
of major new conceptual apparatus has frequently been preceded by
a substantial whittling away at older concepts. But I do not believe
that the process is automatic. An intellectual field may remain dor-
mant for a long period because no man of exceptional vision rises
to offer a new and challenging approach.
1 Abbott Payson Usher, The History of Mechanical Inventions, McGraw-Hill,
1929.
2 Cf. J. B. Conant, On Understanding Science, Yale University Press, 1946.
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This paper will discuss some case studies of innovation, in order
to bring out sharply the nature of technological discontinuities and
some of the reasons for them. The material will be examined in an
essentially Schumpeterian framework. My main concern is with
the pulsating character of innovation and with the entrepreneurial
and technological factors leading in particular sectors of the economy
to growth, maturity, decay, and regeneration.
I am aware that the term "innovation" lacks precise definition.
Yet I prefer it to Usher's "emergent novelty," primarily because I
am impressed by the importance of the entrepreneur as a key figure
in innovative change and wish to stress the distinction between in-
vention and innovation. The entrepreneurial skill required to in-
troduce a major innovation is rare. Economists have too often con-
cluded that, granted an advance in technology and a strong eco-
nomic incentive, innovators will automatically appear. On the
contrary, asin science,significant opportunities frequently lie
available for years, awaiting the right combination of creative vision
and action. Then, once the initial difficulties have been overcome,
the imitative process can be carried out much more rapidly by
men of lesser stature. Later, when the original idea has been fully
exploited, there may again be a long wait for new men and new
money to advance to another stage.
To my thinking, the Schumpeterian hypothesis linking innovation
to long (Kondratieff) cycles in business activity is fruitful for an
analysis of economic growth. While we lack adequate statistical
data for a long enough period of time to arrive at any proven con-
clusions, we can say that there have been waves of high investment
activity associated with particular fields; and there are factors in
the process of invention and innovation that might lead us to ex-
pect the wavelike movement to persist.
Thus if fundamental new concepts occur only at intervals, such
a basic scientific fact may well affect the pace of technological
change. We need to know more concerning the relationship between
the propensity to develop pure science, the propensity to invent,
and the propensity to innovate8 before we can conclude that any
wavelike force exists;4 but in the meantime the hypothesis deserves
further testing.
8SeeW. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, Norton, 1952, and
my article "The Sequence from Invention to Innovation and Its Relation to
Economic Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1953, pp. 97-111.
The reader who wishes to pursue this point further is referred to my Inven-
tion and Innovation in the Radio Industry (Macmillan, 1949), in which con-
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Any analysis of technological change and economic growth needs
also to take account of certain shifts in the demand for innovations
that occur as the more obvious material needs of society are satisfied
and we advance to higher standards of living.
In a mature economy, like that of the United States, opportuni-
ties for investment are likely to become increasingly concerned with
tertiary industries rather than with primary or secondary indus-
tries.5 By tertiary industries I mean all types of service industries,°
including transportation, community services, education, and rec-
reation. In the last 150 years the proportion of our population en-
gaged in agriculture has steadily declined while the percentage
engaged in manufacturing has increased. But we have reached a
stage where the manufacturing proportion can be expected to
diminish.
Today the demand for new technology is distorted by military
considerations. But the potential growth of services intensifies the
need for organizational innovation and for a technology applicable
to the service industries. Successful organization innovations will
require the application of human relations skills of a high order.
It seems not unlikely, therefore, that in America in the second half
of the twentieth century innovating entrepreneurs will be drawn
more from the group of men trained as social engineers than, as in
the first half of the century, from those with a background in physical
engineering.T
2. Some Examples
Whether or not we accept the concept of long waves of business
expansion bearing some approximate relation to a forty-year cycle,
the period from the depression of the l890's to the outbreak of
World War II had certain distinguishing characteristics that can
be usefully analyzed. In the Western economic world, and par-
ticularly in America, this was an era dominated by the growth of
the automobile industry, of electric utilities, and of .the chemical
industries.
siderable attention is given to the relationship between innovative and imitative
entrepreneurship and to the problem of the "cluster effect."
See A. G. B. Fisher, Clash of Progress and Security, London, Macmillan,
1935.
6Considerablymore work could be usefully done to clarify industrial defini-
tions. I include newspapers, television broadcasting, hospitals, helicopter buses,
ski tows, theatres, and community swimming poois as "service industries,"
]:s it too much to hope, as a corollary, that the second half of the twentieth
century will also witness the coming of age of the social sciences?
553MACLAUBIN
THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
The automobile industry has certainly been one of the most
vigorous new industries in America. Yet by the late 1920's the in-
novative characteristics of the industry began to change. There can
be no simple explanation of this fact. But a partial answer lies in
the quality of entrepreneurial leadership, the absence of a research
conception, the explosive rate of previous growth, and the success
of the established oligopoly.
More than any other figure, Henry Ford typified the automobile
industry in its first innovative phase. His principal contribution was
in pressing aggressively for cost-price reductions to achieve a mass
market. He weighed all technological changes against this objec-
tive. A skilled mechanic without professional training, Ford never
included fundamental research as part of his program. Nor was it
part of the program of his competitors. Therefore, while the auto-
mobile industry could perhaps have been preparing during the
1920's for basic innovations, it was in fact not doing so. Henry
Ford himself was aging, though maintaining firm control of the
helm. Thus he did not see the limitations of planetary transmission
until a very costly shift in production was forced on him by his
competitors.
More important than the character of entrepreneurial leadership
was the fact that there was no strong incentive for radical techno-
logical change in the automobile industry in the late 1920's A
sound, efficient, durable car had been produced by the industry
and a vast market demand had materialized. Low-cost mass assem-
bly plants had been constructed; a smoothly working network of
dealer outlets had been established throughout the country; special
credit institutions had been created to finance installment purchases;
and the used-car market was well organized. The automobile in-
dustry had grown up; the major new investment phase was over for
the time being.
What was done next could be broadly described as extensions
and refinements. More cars required, first and foremost, better roads;
and these were provided. Greater riding comfort in the lower-priced
cars was added as automobiles were used increasingly by the masses
for pleasure, and higher speeds were offered for the wide new roads
of the West.
During the 1930's and 1940's, advances continued to take place
in mechanical and chemical engineering which made it technically
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possible to obtain more powerful fuel, more miles per gallon (if
one wanted this, and many who turned to European cars did), and
longer and more economical use of tires; and there was the pos-
sibility, not yet introduced commercially, of a jet engine.
In a dynamic society, technology does not stand still. From this
point of view Usher is certainly correct in stressing the continuity
of technological change. The creative urge is widespread and the
demand for novelty great. But an industry may choose to stress
the novelty of style changes, the recreational use of a radio in a
car, the comfort of a heater, better springs, and other improvements
not requiring a major new investment in capital equipment. By 1980
the American automobile was established as a satisfactory product
in terms of mass demand.
Twenty-three years later one can say that there has been com-
paratively little innovative change. And it is interesting to speculate
on what might have happened if Henry Ford had died, say, in
1929 and left in control a son with a strong innovative flair. I think
that., if he had been as shrewd as his father, such a son would have
been torn between a desire to do something fresh and important
with the automobile and a realization that the more prudent and
sensible policy was to consolidate past gains. Had the desire for
"emergent novelty" been compelling, he might well have turned the
company over to his associates and devoted his energies to some
other field. As a possible parallel, after Paul Hoffman had succeeded
in re-establishing the position of the Studebaker Corp. in the auto-
mobile oligopoly, he shifted his interests to the Economic Coopera-
-tion Administration and the Ford Foundation. It is perfecfly pos-
sible to lose interest temporarily in the generalship of an enterprise
simply because it is running well on its established momentum.
There is in fact an important difference between the life of an
inventor and the life of an innovator, An inventor—like Thomas Edi-
son or Lee De Forest or,in modern America, Edwin Land—
granted some access to sources of capital, can spend his life moving
from one invention to another in a broad field without a major
wrench every time he shifts. Thus Land can work successively on
polarized light and sun glasses, headlight glare, three-dimensional
movies, and a picture-a-minute camera so long as his creative
energies are concerned with the inventive rather than the innovative
phases. Such activities can be financed by royalty returns on patents
or by small-scale manufacturing so long as some of the inventions
are translated into action. Inaction, as in the case of Land, who was
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not able to interest the automobile industry in the headlight glare
problem,8 does not need to be frustrating if the inventor feels that
he has solved the basic technical problem. But the innovator must
succeed through obtaining action; this is much more time-consum-
ing, given the resistances to change which are built into our institu-
tional environment.
I cannot see, therefore, how we can escape from stressing dis-
continuities when we are discussing innovations. It is not indulging
in a "great-man theory" of history to conclude that innovators like
Henry Ford are unusual. If the economic environment is propitious,
such men may have an opportunity to participate in the creation of
an important new field. But when they have done so successfully,
they are not likely to move into another entirely new field with equal
success. More probably they will exploit and develop what they
•have created.
When, therefore, an innovative breakthrough takes place, it tends
to run its course. In modern American industry, dominant innovators
do not usually perpetuate themselves. In the early days of a grow-
•ing enterprise, it is much more feasible to run a one-man show. The
dominant figure can be in on all decisions. But with growth and
success, men of lesser imagination are required to carry out the
original goals. Frequently, control passes to those men who have
devoted their lives, to straightening things out. Such people get
tired of too much change. Even if there is no such delegation of
control, efficient management requires consultation, which is more
time-consuming as the business becomes more complex and which
inevitably slows up bold decisions. If, as occasionally happens, there
is a struggle for power, the loyalties of the organization tend to
group around the mediators rather than the disruptive forces. The
wise innovator, therefore, frequently finds that after a certain stage
of successful achievement he will get more satisfaction from de-
voting his major creative energies to outside activities. This is per-
haps an explanation of many of the extracurricular activities taken
on in middle and later life by successful businessmen. As another
type of reaction, C. F. Kettering, on retiring from Ceneral Motors,
became far more active in research than he had been for years.
There are• thus several reasons to expect that a major innovation
8Anexample, incidentally, of the lack of research-consciousness inthis
industry.
Nepotism is frowned upon, and there are rules against it in many large
enterprises.
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like the automobile will have an explosive expansionary effect that
will later taper off.1° A research conception which was not part
of the intellectual scheme of the automobile industry might help
to maintain the volume of new investment. If the automobile pio-
neers had believed in and understood research, they could have
provided a more interesting innovative record since 1930. But 1
do not believe that research would have provided a major change
in the investment pattern simply because the automobile was such
a success without much real research.h1 More light, however, can
be thrown on the possibilities for continuous innovation if we ex-
amine the record of an industry that sprang from science and that
has placed important emphasis on research from the beginning—
namely, the electrical manufacturing industry.
ELECrPJCALMANUFACrURtNG
Thedevelopment of central power stations and the invention of
the telephone have had as profound an effect on industrial develop-
ment as has the automobile's rise. Partly because the technological
discoveries involved were more recent and more complex than in
the case of the internal combustion engine, the electrical manu-
facturing industry1' and the telephone industry have maintained
a much closer link to science than the automobile industry has.
These ties also developed partly in response to the interest of some
of the scientists who joined the first two industries. Professor Elihu
Thomson founded the Thomson-Houston Electric Manufacturing
Co. in Lynn, Massachusetts in the 1880's. This concern became a
key element in the General Electric Co. when it was founded in
10ConcerningSiegel's comments on this point at the conference, I do not
wish to imply that there is no future for the automobile industry. A giant
corporation has great power to perpetuate itself, especially if it uses creative
research as a method of regeneration. But for the reasons that I have stated,
I believe that a pulsating force in its investment growth is much more probable
than straight-line growth.
11Todate, the research undertaken by the automobile companies has been
aimed at the engineering improvement of existing products rather than the
creation of new products. For classification purposes I prefer to call this type
of work "advanced engineering development," reserving the term "research" for
more fundamental inquiry without such immediate, practical results in mind.
There is some evidence that the automobile industry is very slowly reaching
a comparable assessment of its research role and that important changes in
this respect will occur in the next decade.
12Forreasons that remain somewhat obscure, the electric power companies
and the telegraph companies did not keep nearly as close to science. An excep-
tiOn today is the active research interest of the Detroit Edison Co. in atomic
energy.
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1892. Thomson remained as a consultant of the new company.
In 1900 General Electric decided to establish a research laboratory
at Schenectady devoted to "fundamental scientific inquiry," and
Professor Willis H. Whitney was appointed the first director. It
has become one of the leadingscientificlaboratoriesinthe
United States, with many distinctions, including that of having a
Nobel prize winner—Irving Langmuir—as one of its full-time staff
members.'
General Electric was responsible for many of the advances that
took place in the electric lamp from 1900 to 1940. The patents
acquired from these advances, plus outside patents which were
purchased, gave the company undisputed control of the electric
lamp industry. With decreasing costs through mass production and
steady improvement in machine design, General Electric was able
to make very comfortable profits on the incandescent lamp through-
out this period. In fact, the lamp division was probably the most
profitable division of the entire enterprise and carried a considera-
ble proportion of the total research expenditures for the company.
With this background and with the acquisition for its laboratories
of such notable figures as Irving Langmuir and W. A. Coolidge,
one might have expected General Electric to be ready in the late
1920's with a new form of lighting which would capture the public
imagination. Technically this was possible, for the fundamental
work on the fluorescent lamp had already been done in Europe
by that time. But the propensity to innovate was not there. General
Electric was making profits in incandescent lamps; the lamp was
satisfactory; the company had patent control; everyone in the in-
dustry paid royalties. This scarcely provided the environment out
of which one would expect a rapid change.
Possibly, also, one might have expected General Electric or
Westinghouse, both of which were supporting fundamental scien-
tific research, to pioneer in atomic energy development. Both com-
panies had a major stake in the manufacturing of power equipment
for central stations. Might they not have invited a Niels Bohr
or a Fermi to work in their laboratories on atomic power?
But the commercial prospects for atomic energy seemed and were
still a long way off in the 1920's and 1980's. The leaders of General
Electric, Owen Young and Gerard Swope, who had been responsi-
ble for the recent growth of the company and who were in control
13Theonly industrial laboratory in the United States sharing this honor is
that of the Telephone Co.—through C. J. Davisson.
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in i:his period, had made their mark and acquired comfortable
fortunes. They were, quite properly, more concerned with the future
stability of the enterprise than with taking major risks. It is proba-
bly too much to expect a highly successful business concern pro-
ducing satisfactory products to jump way into the future, even
though the company is research-minded. The business philosophy of
General Electric and Westinghouse was to keep close enough to
science to be somewhat ahead of the times.
In the words of Owen Young: "Fifteen years is about the average
period of probation, and during that time the inventor, the promoter
and the investor, who see a great future for the invention, generally
lose their shirts..:. Thisis why the wise capitalist keeps out of
exploiting new inventions and comes in only when the public is
ready for mass demand."
Even with far-sighted management, which I believe General
Electric had in the 1920's and 1930's, one has to expect a certain
myopia. It is hard to take such a broad view of one's field that you
anticipate its being underrnined.' In my own institution, the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, no major contributions were made
during the 1930's to the exploration of nuclear physics (apart from
developments in instrumentation).
In the General Electric case a research conception did not lead
to any major innovative change in lighting until the fluorescent
lamp was introduced at the end of the 1930's. This was about the
time when the last of the basic incandescent lamp patents were
expiring. Competitively, Ceneral Electric had been in a position to
take its time about such a development. Each concern in the in-
dustry operated under a quota. Patent control was so complete
that it was virtually impossible for any new concern to enter the
industry. The one lighting company which eventually broke away
from General Electric and did some independent work on the
fluorescent lamp (but not the original work) was Sylvania Electric,
whose growth was slow and took place initially under the General
Electric umbrella. By merger and by acquisition, Sylvania eventu-
ally obtained a 6 per cent quota of the total incandescent lamp
business; after that there was nobody else to absorb. It was only
14 Maclaurin, Invention and Innovation in the Radio industry, as cited, p. 88.
15 For example, Western Union, in the period when it was the most powerful
communications company of its day, turned down the opportunity to purchase
the telephone patents of Alexander Graham Bell.
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through the assistance of the Department of Justice that Sylvania
was able to break out from the quota system in about 1940.
It is, of course, impossible to provethata new development such
as fluorescent lighting could in fact have been introduced in the
late 1920's instead of the late 1930's. But the basic technology was
known, and it is my own belief that, if the entrepreneurs in control
of the industry had had their full competitive vigor at the end of
the 1920's, there was no reason why they could not have "ordered"
a new type of lighting. We have reached such an advanced stage of
engineering that, if the basic research has been done, many in-
ventions can be made to order.'° In this sense the process of inven-
tion is no longer subject to the caprices of the lone inventor. Re-
search teams can be assembled from professional engineers, and,
with some reasonable leadership and adequate budgets, a limited
objective such as a change from incandescent lighting to fluorescent
lighting is largely a function of management. My conviction is,
therefore, that the petering out in the process of creation that was
evident in the General Electric and Westinghouse laboratories be-
ginning in the late 1920's was due partly to the fact that, as in the
automobile industry, the companies had had a long run of success-
ful years and their established leaders were more immediately con-
cerned with the protection of past gains than with rushing into
new developments.
I do not wish to imply that the petering out which I think I have
observed is likely to be permanent. There are too many dynamic
forces in the lower layers of a great enterprise to make this proba-
ble. Nor do I believe that a wavelike movement is inevitable. A full
discussion of this point would lead us into the difficult realm of
"succession of management"—a problem to which comparatively
little articulate thought has been given. In specific terms, the ques-
tion of why the quite exceptional top-management team of Young
and Swope did not replace itself would have to be answered.
One other point that should be stressed here is the increasingly
high cost of new technical developments in well-established fields.
When technology becomes more advanced, it is normally no longer
possible to make pioneering inventions with simple technical equip-
ment and inexpensive apparatus. Edison was able to invent and
develop to a commercial stage the original incandescent lamp with
equipment that, by present standards, would be considered exceed-
16Thewartime developments of radar and the atomic bomb are cases in
point.
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ingly crude. But the work of Coolidge and Langmuir in perfecting
the lamp through improved filaments and gas-filling required much
more elaborate experiments and much costlier and more precise
equ:ipment.
Moreover, in order for the fluorescent lamp to compete with an
existing product that had already been perfected, it was essential
that the new lamp work well. Large sums of money had to be spent
on painstakrng experiments with fluorescent powders, on the prob-
lem of end-blackening, on the elimination of flicker, and on in-
stantaneous starting before the lamp was an assured commercial
success. This meant that the propensity to innovate was dependent
on the possession of a large research budget. What eventually hap-
pened was that Sylvania used the fluorescent lamp as a means of
breaking out from under General Electric leadership, although
General Electric did the major development work on the fluorescent
lamp. And General Electric easily won its suit against Sylvania on
fluorescent lamp patents. In fact, with the exception of Westing-
house, none of the licensees in the lamp industry had the resources
or the basic technical skill to undertake a pioneering breakthrough
of this type on its own.
Moreover, to help spread the use of higher-powered incandescent
lamps and fluorescent lamps, General Electric and Westinghouse
found it necessary to spend very substantial sums of money over the
years in institutional advertising of the "better light—better sight"
variety.
To summarize,, then, from the General Electric experience, re-
search, as one would expect, gave the company an opportunity to
maintain a higher level of new investment than would otherwise
have occurred. But from the standpoint of the economy as a whole,
the most significant new investment opportunity lay in a funda-
mental change of energy source from steam power stations to atomic
power. Since such a development is not yetready,it is easy to see
why a business enterprise would not attempt to push too far ahead
of commercial prospects. The sums of money required for atomic
energy development are so vast and the military applications so
direct that government sponsorship is essential. In retrospect, it
seems unlikely that the power companies and the electrical manu-
facturing concerns, even had they wanted to, could have pushed
atomic energy development sufficiently to provide a continuous
innovative investment stream.
On the more limited basis of providing investment in new types
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of lighting, there were better prospects for continuity. But the
patent position of the dominant concern—General Electric—and
the personal goals of the key entrepreneurs in the firm did not
induce such a change until the time was fully ripe.
We are thus faced with an economic dilemma. Patents and mo-
nopolistic position are essential ingredients in providing financial
support and incentives for large-scale resarch on and development
of complex new products. A research-minded company has to work
exceedingly hard during the rapid growth period of a new art to
build up a watertight patent structure. Having done so, it is not
consistent with normal economic motivation for it to throw away
the advantages of the monopoly by forcing a very rapid rate of
obsolescence.
We can see this same problem in another example taken from
the electrical revolution—the radio and television industry.
RADIO AND TELEVISION
In the radio industry there were more competitors than in the
electric lamp industry. But by 1927 the Radio Corporation of
America had obtained undisputed patent control, and thereafter.
every radio-manufacturer in the United States had to obtain a license
from and pay royalties to this concern. RCA conceived of itself
as performing the centralized research function for the entire
industry. Substantial license fees were charged, and the announced
plan was to plow back these royalties into further research.
A somewhat younger industry than lighting, commercial radio
in this country nonetheless dates back to the formation of the
American Marconi Co. in 1899. This concern, which was controlled
from England, was bought and absorbed by the newly formed
Radio CorporatiOn of America in 1919. Owen D. Young of General
Electric was the principal entrepreneurial figure behind this or-
ganizational innovation, with the stock being shared originally by
General Electric, Westinghouse, and the Telephone Co.,allof
which in effect pooled their radio patents in RCA. And since the
concerns which dominated radio research were these same three,
the key entrepreneurial figures were men who had made their
marks by the late 1920's. There has since been a revolt against this
domination, involving new men and newly made money. This re-
volt, however, led by such concerns as Philco, Zenith, and Admiral,
has taken over twenty years to develop. During this period, from
about 1930 to 1950, these newer concerns were primarily concen-
562INNOVATION
trating on methods of breaking down the RCA licensing proced-
ures; their innovative activities were focused on sales and distribu-
tion methods or, as in the case of Sylvania, on low-cost manufactur-
ing of tubes rather than on research and invention. The fact re-
mains, however, that the history of the most important invention
and innovation in the radio industry in the last twenty years, tele-
vision, is primarily a history of research by the large established
concerns—the Telephone Co., General Electric, Westinghouse, and
RCA.
T:he most significant aspect of television research was the high
expenditure for technical development required before any com-
mercial returns were received. The Radio Corporation of America
spent $10 million for research and development in the precom-
mercial stage. The role of government regulation was very sig-
nificant here. New channels had to be obtained; and regulatory
commissions were gravely concerned over their responsibility to
protect people from finding their sets obsolete because of later
developments. The budget for television development bad to come
from the royalty receipts from the licensees, from the profits from
broadcasting, and from the direct manufacture of sets and tubes.
In such a situation, until an established product has been fully
exploited—and this takes a good many years—it may very well not
be to the economic interest of a concern with a dominant position
to push too aggressively with a new product which renders its
current products obsolete. Technologically, commercial television
could have been introduced in 1930, but management was not ready
then to provide the necessary support.
The paradox of technological change and investment lies, in the
fact that the basic shift toward service-type industries is requiring
increasingly expensive preparatory work with government agencies.
Second, research and development are becoming big business in
themselves, and require ample budgets. Under these conditions,
the concern which has not achieved a monopolistic position through
a differentiated product or through patents findsitdifficult to
pioneer in innovations. Though many of our great modern corpora-
tions do "create what they later exploit," I have found no evidence
yet of any large concern which consciously attempts to use re-
search and innovation as a means of maintaining an even flowof
new investment. Nor can I see any reason why new firms can be
counted on to emerge at the right historical moment.
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3. The Next Long Cycle
Though we may be straying jnto the realm of prophecy, it may
help our analysis if we speculate about the long cycle in which
we are now living in America. Let us assume for the purposes
of discussion that the main upward thrust of the present cycle be-
gan about 1940 and was greatly stimulated by the rush of new
technical developments emerging from the war. What industries
can we expect to carry us during the 1950's and the 1960's? And
what part is technology likely to play in such an upward phase?
While we could expect some continuation of technological change
and new investment in the industries that carried the last major
investment wave—electric power, chemicals, and the automobile—
it does not seem probable that these industries will provide new
outlets for investment on anything like the, scale that they created
in the last cycle. In a broad sense, these fields would appear to be
somewhat exhausted. Although the most important new develop-
ment in electric power is atomic energy, a great deal more work
will have to be done in reducing costs before atomic energy is
likely to displace our existing electric power stations. Servomecha-
nisms, on the other hand, may result in an important new invest-
ment in automatic electrical machinery in our factories.
The revolution in chemistry and the rise of the chemical indus-
tries contributed to the last upsurge and can be counted on again in
the next two decades. We have still not exploited all the possibili-
ties for creating new products which represent chemical substitutes
for natural processes.
More promising from the standpoint of capital consumption is the
provision of better community services. Our metropolitan areas
today are mostly obsolete. I should like, therefore, to discuss the
investment opportunities provided by urban redevelopment in the
light of modern technology. Since transportation is a key feature
in such development and commuting distances are reaching the
breaking point, let us also examine the prospects arising from the
technology of the aviation industry. The logical next step in trans-
portation from the city to the country lies in aviation rather than in
the automobile, though we can certainly expect the continuation of
a major investment in new construction of roads. But revolutionary
change would come with the development of large-scale private




Is technology the principal factor inhibiting the growth of private
airplane use? From what I have been able to learn from scientists
and engineers in this industry, I believe not. The basic scientific
work has been completed, making it possible to fly with safety
under most weather conditions in either a helicopter or a helioplane
requiring a short take-off space. But much work still needs to be
done on reducing instrumentation costs, making piloting easier
(especially in a helicopter), and providing landing fields before
a mass market can develop. Without the possibility of a mass
market, assembly line economies are not possible.
What, then, are the bottlenecks? The aviation industry is now
controlled by men who have made their fortunes and built up sub-
stantial enterprises manufacturing large commercial transport planes
and military planes. These markets have very different require-
ments from that for the private plane. High speed and durability are
essential; original cost is comparatively unimportant. In conse-
quence, there has been very little development work by the large,
established manufacturers' on low-cost private planes. In fact, be-
cause of a cost-plus approach and the rapid change of military
models, itis questionable whether the background of the main
aviation industry provides a suitable environment for such work.
A secondary factor is that since aviation is closely regulated and
since there is opposition to every new landing strip, large sums of
money need eventually to be spent in building feeder airports,
creating parking facilities for private planes at such airports, and
getting public acceptance of the private plane in the surburban
backyard.
It is my own belief, therefore, that whether or not this type of
development comes in the next twenty years is primarily a function
of innovative leadership. From the group of small, obscure concerns
now producing helicopters or light planes, one or two entrepreneurs
may emerge with the vision and energy of a Henry Ford. Such
entrepreneurs could take advantage of the vast sums that have
been spent on military research in aviation, but their principal
difficulty will be in building an organization and overcoming re-
sistance to change. The large capital resources of the well-established
company would be a great advantage, but the new risk-taking ap-
proach probably requires new ventures.
'7Suchas Douglas, Boeing, Lockheed, and United.
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If we accept the probability that new men and new money will be
needed for this new type of industry, we must also recognize the fact
that the launching of such ventures is more difficult today and the
obstacles to be overcome are more persistent than they were forty
years ago. One of the prices of SEC regulations, public safety
measures, etc.,is that entrepreneurial innovation becomes much
more difficult. Perhaps it would be more accurate, however, to say
that the process becomes different and that different skills are
necessary. In complicated fields which are tinged with the public
interest, organizational innovation is the most serious bottleneck in
holding up the process of translating technological change into
significant new products.
METROPOLITAN REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING
Similar obstacles beset one of the other major industries which
might carry our next long wave—the housing industry.
The automobile, supplemented soon perhaps by the airplane,
makes it technologically possible now for most Americans to live
in a functional house which is well engineered for a servantless
society and which provides the beauty and restfulness of the country.
The basic research has all been done. The first requisite was to
break down the traditional approach to housing and re-examine
dwellings in the light of modern technology. Such men as Le Cor-
busier and Frank Lloyd Wright were among the pioneers. With the
development of electric household devices, of lower-cost automatic
heating facilities, of new methods of inexpensive glass production,
and of new materials for interior wall construction, an inexpensive
housing product became technologically possible and the general
acceptance of it would represent a very significant improvement in
mass living habits.
But the missing link again, I believe, is organizational innova-
tion. Let us examine some of the obstacles that have to be over-
come.
Companies specializing in prefabricated houses are not likely to
solve the problem. A very small proportion of the cost of housing
is in the shell; the economies obtained by mass production of panels
not only are negligible but are often outweighed by the disecono-
mies of transportation and high overhead costs. A house, far more
than most products, is very much at the mercy of local influences—
local planning commissions, zoning ordinances, and building codes
are key factors.
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The large, established enterprises in building are component
manufacturers such as Johns Manville, Revere Copper & Brass,
American Radiator, and United States Gypsum. These concerns are
in oligopolistic positions where they make comfortable profits, and
because no one of them contributes more than a very small propor-
tion of the total cost of the house, the demand for many of their
particular products is inelastic. One cannot count on very much
from such companies, therefore, in the way of radical cost-cutting
improvements.
The organizational innovation that appears necessaryisthe
emergence of some house-assembling companies of national stature
who will in time develop sufficient power to control and direct
community development wherever they operate. There have already
emerged from the chaos of the individual-house-building industry
a few enterprises of regional stature—such as Levitt & Sons. But
it is very uncertain whether these essentially. local concerns—suc-
cessful in serving their particular communities—can grow beyond
this. Most house-building concerns lack the capital resources or the
management skills to serve more than a local area. American in-
dustries have characteristically grown through branch plants. But
this growth has not normally had to contend with the exceptional
strength of local influences in housing. Housing enterprises also
have had to weather the high degree of seasonality and cyclicality
of the industry, which has meant that many attempts at mass pro-
duction have led to bankruptcy through high overhead costs and
inadequate capital.
It may well be that the housing industry will have to grow very
slowly, first through the emergence of a few local innovators with
Vision and then by merger of the more vigorous elements on a
regional and national scale. I believe, however, that to develop the
full investment potentialities of the industry, an organizational in-
novation not now in existence and different from that in most other
industries will be required. The men who are to provide the leader-
ship for such an innovation will have to understand the nature
of the challenge. If they do so, the necessary technology for sig-
nificant reduction in costs will be at their command.
4. Conclu.rions
By discussing the process of invention and innovation in par-
ticular firms and particular industries, I have tried in this paper
to indicate that:
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1. Invention and innovation do not go hand in hand, and there
is 'no predictable time lag between them.
2. Basic breakthroughs in the physical sciences leading later to
revolutionary changes in technology are discontinuous.
8. Due to the infrequency of the appearance of innovators, the
comparative ease of imitation, and the resulting tendency for entre-
preneurial activity to come in clusters, innovations are likely to
peter out when the key figures associated with them have carried
their original ideas to their logical conclusion.
4. The emergence of the large corporation with a research or-
ganization suggests that regeneration is more probable in corpora-
tions today than it was 100 years ago.
5. The initiation of major innovations usually requires new men
and new money—a requirement which is likely to be met by new
firms. I believe that the "new men" are much the most troublesome
part of this sequence. In completely new fields it is relatively easy
to launch a small new firm; and, while new methods are necessary
to obtain capital for new ventures, the right man can usually find
the money.
6. For the last 100 years at least, technology has had a tendency
to outrun innovation, so that at any given point of time the pos-
sibility of applying technology to the introduction of new products
has greatly outdistanced the actual performance. In fields domi-
nated by large, established corporations the problem of succession
of management is to place new men at the top with innOvative
vigor equal to that of their immediate predecessors.
7. As higher standards of living bring about a shift from primary
and secondary manufacturing to tertiary or service-type industries,
organizational innovations become increasingly important.
8. Since itis apparent that innovating entrepreneurs are rare
and that needed skills are changing in character, much more careful
study could profitably be given to the nature of those skills and
the proper environment in which to train men in them.
C 0 M M E N T
WAL.nrR IsAiw, Massaáhusetts Institute of Technology
In discussing Usher's paper I shall dwell upon its implications
(and those of his works in general) for the study of economic
growth. For I believe that he points up a basic set of considerations
which thus far has not received adequate attention.
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Usher views the historical record as a basic interaction of tech-
nology and resources. The advance of technology, and more spe-
cifically its introduction into our society in the form of innovation,
have proceeded not randomly but continuously, at times at accelerat-
ing rates, at times at decelerating rates, and even at times at rates
approaching zero which have presented plateau periods.
At any given point of time an innovation occurs at one place, or at
least at a relatively few places, in the world. Its spatial diffusion
over wide areas of the world proceeds also at accelerating, de-
celerating, and even zero rates. Any advance in technology con-
stantly revalues the resources of any particular area, so techno-
logical progress over time constantly changes both the absolute and
the relative productivity potential of each area, since each has a
unique resource endowment.
•However, technological progress is a social process. It is not
divorced from society; in fact, it is much influenced by the values
of any given society. The direction and rate of technological prog-
ress in any given area and the rate at which innovation successful
elsewhere is accepted are significantly affected by the cultural traits
and patterns of the people of that area. Among those cultural traits
and patterns, the economic institutions, institutions regarding prop-
erty ownership, monetary and financial institutions, and practices
of business organizations are of major significance in their effect on
technological progress and the acceptance of progress. Hence, in
studying economic growth and capital formation, we confront a
complex interaction of social, political, economic, and geographical
factors, as Kuznets has so neatly argued.
But no matter how much we emphasize entrepreneurial attitudes,
community relations, financial institutions, saving habits, and the
like, there is still a basic play of technology upon resources—re-
sources which differ from area to area and which give these areas
different productivity potentials at any given point of time.
Let us now leave this world of generalities and become more
concrete. Let us consider the papers by Kuznets and Goldsmith.
A wealth of interesting, though tenuous, statistical material was
presented. A number of interesting hypotheses emerged. But it
seems to me that before one can reach any meaningful conclusions
about economic growth from these materials one must build around
them a perspective in both time and space. One must put these
data against a background which for key points of time in the
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past, given the state of technology, yields the different productivity
potentials existing in the various areas of the world. One cannot
escape the fact that the existence of different productivity potentials
greatly influences the rate at which the areas can accumulate capital,
or their ratios of capital formation to national output, and so forth.
I wish we had before us a table on the resource endowment of
different parts of the world—a table such as Usher has developed
or such as that in A. J. Brown's pamphlet on Industrialization and
Trade.' It would show very striking inequalities in the current re-
source positions of the various areas. No one, I am sure, would
deny that these major differentials, given our existing technology,
greatly influence the rates at which the various nations can ac-
cumulate and invest capital today. And so it has been at every point
of time in the past. My point is that in order, to utilize efficiently the
data which Kuznets and Goldsmith have developed one must con-
sider the historical impact of changing technology upon different
resource potentials, along the lines that Usher suggests in his paper
and in some of his other writings.
Let me proceed to another concrete illustration. The discussion
earlier in this conference centered around the entrepreneur and
the conditions which influence entrepreneurial action. There was
much talk about comparing social conditions and organizations of
various kinds and their associated national rates of growth—com-
paring those in France with those in Germany, or with those in
England or Japan. I heartily endorse comparative analysis—but only
of the right kind. Once in a while one heard at the conference the
word "resources," in the general context of "mineral resources." But
there did not seem to be any recognition of what I would consider
a rather elementary fact, namely: A given difference in social con-
ditions (assuming that we can isolate and agree upon that differ-
ence) will yield one set of discrepancies in growth rates among
nations when resource or productivitij potentials are the same, and
a significantly different set of discrepancies when resource or pro-
ductivity potentials are significantly different.
Let me be more specific by referring to Hoselitz's paper. He
states: "Compared with Britain, France exhibits a pattern of re-
tarded economic growth and industrialization. Yet in the history
of the two countries there was a time when there were few apparent
differences in the over-all productivity of the various factors, and
1London,Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943.
570INNOVATION
when technological procedures and general economic organization
appear to have been on a fairly even level" (page 294). After con-
sidering differences in raw materials endowment and geographical
position, be concludes that to explain the differences in rates of
growth between Britain and France, "the decisive factors have to
be sought rather in their respective social environments" (page
295). I may be misinterpreting Hoselitz, but I feel that at least this
is the viewpoint of many who have joined in the discussion at the
conference.
In attempting to prove that the French resource position for the
basic iron and steel industry was as good as the British, Hoselitz
presents some materials on ores and imports of iron into both Britain
and France. I do not wish to quibble about the data for they are
not the important ones. With respect to the iron and steel industry
during the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century,
coal resources, not ore resources, were the most strategic. This is
obvious when one considers that from 7 to 10 tons of coal and only
2 to 3 tons of ore were required for 1 ton of malleable iron or steel.
The importance of coal emerges conclusively from the actual figures
on malleable iron and steel production, which show that modern
iron and steel furnaces have been oriented to coal sites rather than
ore sites.
To repeat, coal was the most strategic factor in iron and steel
location. And with respect to coal, given the techniques of the
eighieenth and nineteenth centuries, the British position was far
superior to the French. One cannot deny that this was an important
factor in the differences in their rates of growth.
I do not want to be misunderstood and accused of being a geo-
graphical determinist. I do not wish to minimize the entrepreneurial
and general cultural factors; they are very important. If French
entrepreneurship had been more vigorous, techniques of blending
coal and of treating inferior coals to make them more useful could
have been worked out so as to improve France's inferior coal
position. Nonetheless, to some extent at least, the difference would
have persisted.
To conclude, what I am urging is that we should not under-
estimate study of the impact of changing technology upon resource
patterns, much along the lines that Usher has pioneered. If the
economic historian or economic development theorist is to make
headway in attacking the entrepreneurial or the capital formation
problem, be must develop a framework which recognizes that the
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historical data for diverse regions reflect the compounding and
interaction of numerous social, cultural, and institutional differences
as well as differences in resources and productivity potentials.
IRViNG H. SIEGEL, The Twentieth Century Fund
1. The Possibility of a Framework. In his opening paragraph
Maclaurin makes a passing reference to the fact that "The most
serious difficulty" in the study of factors influencing economic growth
"is to provide a framework in which the various contributions can
be additive." I want to comment on this important subject first.
Since the study of economic growth is in a significant sense a
branch of history, a search for a unique framework (or for alterna-
tive frameworks really congruent with each other) seems destined
to fail. The history of history further suggests that a word like
"progressive" is preferable to "additive." Earlier contributions suf-
ficiently prove their worth when they stimulate the formulation or
facilitate the testing of new hypotheses, when they encourage or
aid the reinterpretation of given data from new vantage points.
Historians have never agreed upon a unique framework, and
students of growth likewise approach their own many-faceted
subject with a proper variety of preconceptions and interests. In-
vestigators of growth are bound to have different preferences con-
cerning (1) the unit of observation or the level of inquiry, (2)
the system of categories for which data should be accumulated or
hypotheses formulated, and (8) the amount of data which ought
to be collected prior to the design and testing of hypotheses.
As for the first point, growth obviously has its "micro" and
"macro" levels. Thus a researcher may wish to concentrate on the
origin and vicissitudes of a principle, process, or product; or on the
life and work of a key individual; or on the evolution of a firm or
industry as a quasi-organism; or on the changing role of government;
or on the economic development of one or more countries.
As for the second point, opinions will naturally differ on the
categories which are most convenient, relevant, or fruitful for the
analysis of growth. Thus the selected categories may emphasize the
critical role of certain human bents or modes of possible behavior—
like the so-called "propensities" of Rostow1 and Maclaurin.2 More
1 w•W.Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth, Norton, 1952.
2w. Rupert Maclaurin, "The Sequence from Invention to Innovation and Its
Relation to Economic Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, February
1953, pp. 97-111.
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often, thelistsof growth determinants also explicitly include
significant nonhuman categories. Abramovitz, for example, mentions
five broad categories—the supplies of the factors, the attributes of
the population, economic organization, legal and political institu-
tions, and provisions for acquiring and using knowledge. Many
other students, like J. M. Clark, Clough, and Moulton, offer some-
what similar lists; and Spengler presents a much more detailed one.4
Still another approach is exemplified by the mathematical-model-
builders, who are satisfied with a small number of quantifiable
aggregative variables for studying the behavior of the whole econ-
omy or of a major sector. A much more popular quantitative ap-
proach emphasizes trends and relationships among time series.
This one is typified by the work of most government and private
research organizations and of such academic students as Cohn
Clark.
As for the third point, the inseparability of fact and theory should
be obvious, whatever the tactical emphasis at the outset of any
investigation. Nevertheless, debates on this matter still erupt. The
recent controversy between representatives of the Cowles Com-
mission and the National Bureau of Economic Research on the roles
of empiricism and hypothesis covered essentially the same territory
as an exchange almost a generation earlier between Lowe and
Mitchell.
While no pseudo-Kepler is likely to arise and persuade us to
adopt a unique framework, we must nevertheless recognize that
modern conditions favor the revival of "laws of history," of agreeable
evolutionary or dialectical "stage" theories of development, of
streamlined versions of the "historicism" against which the Poppers
and Hayeks still declaim. In a tense world well wired for sound,
in which deliberate growth is the order of the day, more attention
is likely to be paid to the originator or propagator of a bold, grand,
oversimple, mathematically grounded hypothesis than to the scholar
who is content to "chronicle small beer."
Maclaurin's paper, like his well-known. earlier work, deals es-
sentially with "micro" phenomena, with the role of key individuals
or pivotal firms in the growth of particular industries. From studies
Moses Abramovitz, "Economics of Growth," in A SurveyofContemporary
Economics, Bernard F. Haley, editor, Irwin, 1952, pp. 132-178.
Joseph J. Spengler, in Problems in the Study of Economic Growth, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1949.
Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1927, pp. 59-80.
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of such cases he seeks to distill ideas concerning the determinants
and the character of growth in general. His categories are non-
quantitative. Elsewhere I have had occasion to endorse his literary
case-study approach as a necessary element of an eclectic research
program.6
2. Discreteness of Innovation. Maclaurin prefers to emphasize the
discrete nature of innovation on the "micro" and "macro" levels. He
observes a tendency for the innovating entrepreneur (unlike the
inventor) and his vehicle, the firm, to pursue the exploitation of
only one basic technological idea. He is also impressed with the
appearance of innovating entrepreneurs and firms in bunches, in
many industries at one time, as though marshalled by the "wave-
like force" of a Kondratieff cycle.
While change may be viewed on the "micro" level in terms of
unitary ideas, it is important not to overlook the familiar fact of
diversification, of coexistence within a firm of many such ideas in dif-
ferent phases of evolution. The innovating entrepreneur may come,
exploit his great idea, and go; but the innovating entrepreneurship
of a firm (especially of a corporation) may still survive, finding
new champions and new avenues of expression. Numerous firms may
be named—especially in the chemicals industry, unfortunately not
discussed by Maclaurin, but even in the industries he does consider
—which are continually diversifying their processes and products,
growing in new technological directions from within, through
merger, or through cooperative undertaking with other companies.
The overlapping of discrete pulses of innovation could form a
fairly continuous whole, even as short fibers make a long thread.
I do not share Maclaurin's belief in the fruitfulness of the Schum-
peterian thesis linking innovation to the long cycle of business
activity. In so saying, I do not mean to deny various important
points Maclaurin makes—for example, that innovation does not neces-
sarily follow invention, that skillful innovating entrepreneurship is
rare, that imitation is easier than innovation, that scientific break-
throughs occur only occasionally, that successful individuals and
firms could lose their zest for novelty in the course of exploiting one
idea. I mean rather that an adequate "macro" theory of innovation
must explain more than the clustering of new investment opportuni-
ties, inasmuch as new unitary ideas actually are being introduced
and developed continually. The long cycle, moreover, is obscure. It
6H. SiegeE "Technological Change and Long-Range Forecasting," Journal
of Business, July 1953, pp. 155-156.
• 574iNNOVATION
requires more concrete definition ihan as a "wavelike force" if it
is to explain anything. Besides, such a cycle might better be re-
garded as only a manifestation, a consequence rather than a cause,
of the phenomenon of clustering.
To explain clustering, we should look for significant historical
conjunctures, for transitory circumstances of potent, pervasive influ-
ence. For example, war and preparation for war, which have no
explicit part in Maclaurin's scheme (except, perhaps, as retardants
of the anticipated shift in economic activity toward the tertiary in-
dustries), provide occasions and conditions for broad innovational
breakthroughs. Might not the technological history of our country
be convincingly rewritten in terms of the "waves" of investment in
novelty "generated" by Korea—World War II, World War I, the
Spanish-American War, the Civil War, etc? The result would of
course be a caricature, but a likeness nevertheless. In short, Kondra-
tieff could be dispatched with Occam's razor.
3. Three Cases. Maclaurin's brief sketches of the automobile,
electrical manufacturing, and radio and television industries are
instructive moral tales. These industries presumably took at the
flood a Kondratieff wave that led on to fortune. The automobile
industry achieved success without benefit of research-minded leaders
or of sustained innovation in the large sense. The other industries
have a strong research tradition, but innovation there has been
slowed by past profitable investment, monopoly power of the
dominant firms, and cost and patent restraints on would-be chal-
lengers.
Diversification is conspicuously neglected in Maclaurin's treat-
ment of the three industries. The electrical manufacturing industry
is discussed in terms of lamps—one unitary idea—only. Nothing is
said of the numerous other product lines of Westinghouse or Gen-
eral Electric; or of their wide range of research activities.7 The discus-
sion of the automobile industry might have mentioned the ventures
of Ford into tractors and, briefly, into aircraft; or General Motors'
tie-up with Du Pont, its production of diesel-electric locomotives,
its quasi-public status as a munitions contractor.
Maclaurin's sketches suggest gaps in the theory of economic de-
cision-making which need consciously to be filled. First, the be-
havior of the innovating entrepreneur should be brought within
the same formal calculus that includes the entrepreneur who ac-
C. G. Suits, "Seventy-five Years of Research in General Electric," Science,
October 23, 1953, pp. 451-456.
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cepts the existing boundaries of economic space. Second, innova-
tion and all other alternatives open to the entrepreneur (including
research, rounding out of product lines, market expansion through
advertising, and organizational innovation to save taxes) should be
brought under the sway of a common principle like "marginalism"
or game theory. As usual, such a treatment of decision-making would
be instructive even though it would mean an idealization of actual
behavior.
Finally, I wish Maclaurin had more explicitly related his con-
clusions of the three case studies to his anticipations of the "next
long cycle." The "paradox of technological change and investment"
to which he refers has often been interpreted as an omen of stagna-
tion or as an argument for strong antitrust or other measures to
foster competition. Yet in Maclaurin's treatment this paradox does
not seem to pose special obstacles to the future growth of existing
industries or to the expansion of a company into new fields. Pre-
sumably, the flow of nongovernment investment funds will somehow
remain adequate for a vigorous, growing economy. The only real
worry, it seems, is the availability of the entrepreneurial talent to,
say, solve the problems of organizational innovation besetting ter-
tiary industries like private aviation and prefabricated housing. But
there are some fundamental questions here which should not be
obscured by the confident (and largely plausible) proposition that
"the right man can usually find the money."
4. Growing Points of the Economi. It would be idle to match
prophecies concerning the "next long cycle" in view of the hazards
and the melancholy history of technological forecasting.8 I wish
instead to make some remarks on the methodology of inquiries into
technological prospects.°
The Twentieth Century Fund study of such prospects, which
has been in progress for more than two years, suggests that the
growing points in the economy are numberless and almost every-
where (even in existing monopolistic firms). The sites of new growth
are to be found in the primary and secondary as well as in the
tertiary industries. The directions of growth are shaped by the re-
search and development activities pursued competitively or with
government funds throughout the private production sector; by the
demands of government, especially for security purposes; and by the
8Seemy article in the Journal of Business, cited above.
See also I. H. Siegel, "Conditions of Technological Progress," American
Economic Review, May 1954, Pp. 161-177.
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demands of the household sector as it seeks a higher standard of
material welfare and an upgrading of the quality of "leisure." The
pervasive circumstance of cold war, with its "distorted" incentives
and its emphasis on the technical training of manpower, spurs the
discovery and development of new principles, processes, and prod-
ucts which today are directed toward military ends but tomorrow
will be convertible to civilian needs. (Maclaurin's private helicopters
—or, mOre probably, "helibuses"—will be reckoned among the prog-
eny of the Korean affair, even as peacetime atomic energy should be
counted with the technological offspring of World War II. In these
instances, as in so many others, government is at least the midwife
if not the father.)
To investigate systematically the technological prospects of the
economy, it would seem desirable to give explicit recognition to re-
search and development in the primary and secondary as well as
the tertiary industries. We may emphasize the limitations of Cohn
Clark's Procrustean triple classification by designating such indus-
try-creating activity as itself a quaternary industry. Second, explicit
attention should be given to government entrepreneurship—to
leadership in organizational and institutional innovation, in the
conception of and demand for new munitions prototypes, in the
training of the military and civilian personnel who will eventually
facilitate the peacetime use of military ideas, in setting up new
industries (like atomic energy), in effecting substantial resource
improvements, etc. Again, for purposes of dramatization, we may
call such activities quinary or fifth-order. Finally, note should be
taken of the increasing variety and volume of appliances, gadgets,
amusements, etc., demanded for leisure-time activities. The totality
of consumers may be imagined to form a th.th-order industry,
especially insofar as they demand and use goods and services be-
yond the level of subsistence. (A seventh-order category, based on
specialized foreign demand—which could become significant in the
next few decades—may also be defined.)
In short, a triple classification appears too gross for the study
of long-term growth. The tertiary category, especially, is too broad
and heterogeneous. To assert the shift of activity in the direction
of this category is not very illuminating. Besides, this sort of
proposition tends, like the nonstatistical "stage" theories, to con-
fuse what Clapham designated as logical succession and historical
succession. While Maclaurin stresses organizational innovation in
the "next long cycle," the importance of such activity throughout
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our history should not be overlooked. For example, the Constitu-
tion, the National Banking Act, the Morril Act, and the Federal Re-
serve Act were triumphs of organizational innovation within the
tertiary category (government) even while the primary or sec-
ondary industries were in the ascendant. The development of the
commercial corporation and the growth of consumer credit (to
which Maclaurin alludes in his discussion of the automobile in-
dustry) are other early organizational landmarks.
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GENERAL THEORETICAL
APPROACHES